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PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
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Abst1act. This paper addresses. the need for an appropriate competition law and regim~ 
in l>apua New Guinea and commems on the existing legal landscape arc aimed at 
fostering competition. The paper also highlights the steps that are now being taken h) 
devise a competition law regime, based on the two waves of attempts. The paper 
concludes with some personal assessments of the prevailing situation and gazes into th.:: 
unknown, particularly in the implementation of the new regime. On current indications. 
the new Independent Consumer and Competition Commission should ~ up and rurmin,! 
by the end of this year 2002. 
*Pro .. cssor Lawrence Kuna Kalinoe is Executive Dean at the School of Law. lJnivcrsir~ 
of Papua New Guinea. 
§Paper initially prepared for the Tntemational Conference: Competition and Coll)pctition 
Law in Small Jurisdictions, Valletta Malta, 21-23 May 1998 at the Islands and Small 
States Institute, University of Malta and subsequently revised for publication 
Introduction 
Whilst attempts have been made to formulate a consumer protection policy for Papua 
l\ew Guinea (PNG) since 1977 with the P~G La\\ Reform Commission's (LRC. 1977) 
Report on Fairness ofTran.mctions (LRC, 1981) and subsequently the LRC's Working 
Paper No. 17 on Consumer Protection, until the early 1990s, no attempts were to 
formulate a nutionul competition policy nnd competition lo.w. It is speculatively oj>scrved 
that this may have been due t.o the historical fact that PNG had just emerged as rl nation 
(attained Independence on 16 September 1975) from an Australian colonial otlt):!ost and 
there was very little private sector investment in the economy. As a result, the 
government through it.s pamstatals became the major investor usually as public s~tor 
monopolies. These parastatals were also legislatively vested with regulatory po\\·ers 
(Trebilcock, 1983; Whitworth, 1992). These conditions were therefore not conducive to 
encouraging competition. The end result was that competition policy and law were placed 
well and truly on the back burner. It was only in the earl) 1990s when the PN<i 
Government rode on the international wa\ e of corporatisation and privatisation that 
issues pertaining to competition policy and competition law began to be considered. In 
fact when the PNG Government (under then Prime Minister Pais Wingti) adopted an 
otlicia: corporatisation and privatisation policy, 
it became apparent that it also had to adopt a competition policy and com petitio~ law so 
that the objectives of its corporatisation 1md privati7.ation programmes were ~ot lost. 
Since the ultimate objective of the corporatisation and privatisation policy was to achieve 
allocative and productive efficiency and generate economic growth by removing all 
barriers to entry into a market and therefore encourage competition, it wa~ vitally 
important that an appropriate competition policy and regime be set in place (Kalinoc, 
1996). 
An Appropriate Competition Law for Papua Nc" Cuinea 
Since the ultimate objective of corporatisation and privatisation is to achieve allocati\\~ 
and productive efficiency and gcncr<~.tc growth by deregultLtion (i.e .. removing barriers to 
entry, etc .. ) and encouraging and enhancing competition, it is of vital importance that an 
appropriate competition policy and regime he put in place. Without these, the advantages 
of corporatisation and privatisation can easily be lost. This ba~ undoubtedly ~een the 
catalyst for the conception of a competition law and policy. 
More importantly, however, approp1iate competition law and policy are needed to ensur\! 
that C<>mpanics do not abuse their market power to the disadvantage of consumers and 
their competitors. 
The paper considers the existing legislative framework relating to competition law anJ 
polic) in Papua ~e\• Guinea. Following that, issues penaining to the designing of an 
appropriate competition law and policy. will he considered in the light of recent 
economic policies and progran1mes adopted by the national government, in earnesth 
pursuing the proces~es of corporatisation, and privatisation of stale-owned entetpriscs in 
the country. 
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Review of Country Situation 
As alluded to earlier, Papua \lew Guinea does not, as at the time of Y.Titing, have specific 
legislation on competition law and its regulation, like the Trade Practices Act 1974 of 
Australia or the dual Commerce Act 1986 and the rair Trading Act 1986 ¢f New 
Zealand. Oitlerent and separate legislation do however provide varying degrt><' of 
regulation and or protection. focusing on consumer protection, regulating ccrtai¥ unfair 
trading practices and the misuse of market power. The first of such legislatio1? is the 
Goods Act Ch. No.251 (Revised Laws), which protects consumers against the sale of 
defective goods, and attempts to provide a statutory bases for redress. 
The sewnd legislation is the Commercial Advertisement (Protection of the Public) Act 
Ch Nc. 352 (Revised Laws) which regulates commercial advertisements. prohibiting 
unfair and misleading statements in commercial advertising. The third legislation of 
relevance is the Consumer Affairs Council Act 1993 which in essence is a consumer 
protection legislation. rather than one that regulates competition and anti-competitive 
behaviour in markets. This legislation provides for the regulation of the conduct of 
traders and suppliers, in the provision of goods and services to consumers and to protect 
the interest of conswncrs in this connection. The Act therefore establishes the CQnsumcr 
Affairs Council to enforce this legislation, and inter alia to formulate policies in r~lation 
to consumer protection and to advise the government accordingly. 
The fourth legislation of reference in this regard is the Fairness of Transactions Act 1993 
(No. 28 of 1993) which has eventually come into effect on September 25, 1998 upon 
gazettal. This legislation has an interesting background. It was initially mooted in the 
LRC Report No.6 of 1979 but \\'liS introduced as a private members bill, with the main 
object:vc of offering some protection to people who were referred to as ·illiterate' anJ 
who were invariabl} in ·economically weaker· positions. (a large majority of whom were 
indigenous Papua New Guinean customary landholders), against unfair economic 
development contracts, entered into with multinational corp<>rations, particu).,rl) in 
forestry and mining. This legislation covers unconscionable conduct, applied to ·'all 
transactions" (s.3) and not those economic development contracts only. 
The fifth legislation in this regard is the Prices Regulations Act Ch No. 320 ~Rev i sed 
Laws), particularly Part IV of the Act which prohibits the unfair market practices of 
speculating in goods (s.31) and the cornering and restriction of the circulation of goods 
(s.32) Section 32 (I) is of particular interest. It say!>: "A person who, with intent to 
comer the market or to restrain trade, holds or buys up good' and stores or restrains them 
in his possession or under his control is guilty" of an offence. The prescribed penalty 
involves the forfeiture to the State of the "whole of the goods" or such other quantity as 
ordered by the court. 
Apart from these statutes, by the operation and application of Schedule 2.2 of the 
Constirution. which adopts the common law of England as at St:ptcmber 1975, to apply in 
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the COWltry as part of the underlying law, the relevant common law principles concerning 
competition Ia\\ as adopted under Schedule 2.2 of the Constitution. appl} as well. 
From d1e point of view of the government's push to deregulate and privatisc "ihat are 
virtually state-owned monopolies, particularly in the ectricity, telecommunication, and air 
transport sectOr$. that is the need to develop and adopt an appropriate competition policy 
and 1~" to complement its privatisation policy and pro~ram. This point is acknowledged 
by Asiamoney when they say: 
"Other legal complexities which need to be addressed in the 
case of privatisation include the establi~hmt:nt of anti-tru;t 
legislation to prolt:et against unfair dealing or creation or 
monopolies as well as a statul<lry body to ensure that 
essential goods and services reach all Papua New Guineans 
at a fair price (Asiamone)', 1993).'' 
An Appropriate Competition La,. and Policy 
Competition is the process of "striving or potential striving of two or morepersons or 
organisations against one another for the same or related object (Denh. F.G .. 1997). ·'The 
Hilmer Report explains that" the real likelihood of competition occurring (i.e. potential 
striving) can have a similar effect on the performance of a firm as actual striving. Thus. a 
market which is highly open to potential rivals kno>\~1 as a highly contestable[ market 
may be of similar efficiency as a market with actual head-to-head competition (llilmer 
Report, 1993)." The Hilmer Report goes on to explain that competition need not 
necessarily be between a large number of small firms but a fe\1. large firms since they 
may be able to provide more economic benefits due to economies of scale and sc?pe in 
production, marketing technology and management (ibid). 
The Report goes further to explain that competition "need not be between identical 
products or services. Economics have long recognised competition between substitutes. li 
is the striving to meet the same consumer need that is the t!ssence of competitio11 and this 
1s reflected in the ways in which this is mel by uillerent tnMket participants (ibid)" 
Competition policy should he aimed at facilitating eiTective competition to promote 
efficiency and economic gmv.1h as well as accommodating situations where col"petition 
does not achieve efliciency or conllicts with other social objectives. llence, the following 
bmac policy objectives should be considered when developing a national competition 
poliC). 
These include: 
• the need to limit any anti-competitive conduct of firms; 
• removing regulations which unjustifiably restrict competition; 
• reforming the structure of public monopolies to facilitate competition; 
and 
• restraining monopoly pricing behaviour (ihid:7). 
The objectives arc hereunder considered separately. 
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Anti-Competitive Conduct 
Anti-competitive conduct covers a wide range of anti-competitive bt:haviour. These mav 
include (Healey, 1993; Miller, 1994; Heydon, 1993):any agreement. arrangements. 
understandings I or covenants that may have the effect of substantially lessening 
competition; price fixing where competitors enter into a contract, arrangements or 
understanding which bas the purpose or effect of fixing. controlling or maintaining th;, 
price, discount. allowance, rebate or credit for goods or servJCtli;• misuse of market 
power where the firm in enjoyment of substantial market power take advantago:: of sue;, 
market power to eliminate or damage competition e.g .. by substantmlly damaging :l 
competitor by predatory pricing and preventing someone from entering a mnrket tlr 
deterring someone from being competitive (Pengilley, 1994); resale price maintcnanc.:: 
where the supplier stipulates the minimum price at >vhich the retailer can retail or 
advcrt.sc for sale at that price (Lindgren and Entrekin, 1973) price discrimination. wht:r~ 
the supplier has a dominant position in a market and is selling goods of the snme grade 
and quality at different prices where the price differential is of such magnitude. or of such 
recurring character, that it is likely to have an effect of substantially lc~scning. 
competition, unless the ditlerent can be justified in terms of costs or mafhing a 
competition offer; and where a merger or takeover of a rival competing comp 1y '~ill 
have the effect of substantially lessening competition in a market (Senate Co mittcc. 
1991; fonking, 1992). 
Restructuring of Public Monopolies 
Public monopolies should be restructured in a manner which separates retulatory 
functions from the commercial trading activities. The regulatory functions shoul then b..: 
tmn.slerred to a government body to act as regulator. It is interesting to note that n PNG. 
this process has been initiated in relation to the Post and Telecommunications in the 
Winbrti Government when it initiated legislative process to "separate regulatory function 
from operation functions." 
·1 he restructuring of public monopolies should go further to providing acccso; 
arrangements to certain facilities that are essential for competition such as for exampk 
access to the telecommunications network. 
Further to the above. a price surveillance regime should be established to monitor, 
counter and restrain monopoly pricing behaviour (Hilmer Report). 
I ContraCL\, arrangements and understandings include even the must infonnal arrangements. 
as long as there is a "meeting of minds" or a common expectation about how the 
panics will behave then there is an understanding. Even if there is nothing in writing 
"wink and a nod is enough! 
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Competition Law Regime 
The general purpose and scope of the competition law re~:ime to be conceived in Pap113 
'>lev. Guinea should contain provisions ''hich proscrihe and regulate agreements. 
arrangements and conduct aimed at procuring and maintaining competition in t'fde <tnU 
conunerce. Some of the specific concerns have been idemificd above. The o~jeljlivcs of 
the regime should be to:prevent anti-competitive conduct in order to encourage 
competition and efficiency in business, resulting in a greater choice for consu01ers in 
price qualit} and service; and further safeguard the position of consumers in their 
dealings with producers and sellers (Trade Practices Commission, 1992-93). 
Recent Initiatives 
As indicated earlier, there has been two wa' es of initiatives to promulgate a suitable 
competition Ia" and policy. The period up to 1999 represents one wave and the second 
w~ve begins around mid 2000 when a different approach was taken to the orig~1al, and 
varioLL~ new concepts have been introduced, but particularly directed at !offering 
protection to consumers of goods and services of public utilities and such other services 
"hich the state-owned enterprises" ere performing immediately before pri,atization. We 
"ill therefore look at these two waves separately beginning with the ftrst wave that came 
about in the mid to late 1990s. 
Initiative in Connection with the 1996 Act 
Actual step!. to devise a competition law and policy in Papua New Cluinea were taken 
after the establishment of the Consumer Affairs Council in 1995 under the l~islativc 
authority of the Consumer Affairs Council Act 1993.1n many ways, the initiativ and the 
drive to devise a suitable competition law and policy came from the founding xecutivc 
Director of the Council, Mr. Daniel Kapi. Upon assuming office, Mr. Kapi realized that 
the Consumer Affairs Council Act 1993 onl) provided for the regulation of the pro,ision 
of goods and services to consumers and to protect the interests of consumers in this 
regard, but the Act did not provide for the regulation of unfair trading practice! such as 
abuses of market power, price Jixing arrangements, resale price maintenance lmd such 
other anti competitive behaviour which at the end of the intricate web of commerce. 
injured consumers. Mr. Kapi then began work on the draft legislation in 1995. The initial 
inte111ion then was to amend the Consumer Affairs Council Act 1993 to give the Council 
additional powers relating to the regulations of competition or trade practites. This 
proposed legislation was to be known as the Consumer A fl'airs and Fair Trading ~ct 1996 
1 he mderl) ing policy behind this legislation is set out in the prean1ble of the drdli 
legislation as being: 
I. to prov!de for the regulation of the supply of goods and services and the profection of 
consumer mtcrests; I 
2. to preserve competition in trade and commerce to the extent required by the public 
mtercst; 
6 
3. to c>tablish the Consumer Affairs Council and other authorities and making prpvision 
for their composition function w1d powers; and 
4. other purpose related or incidental to the above stated purposes. 
In keeping with the underlying purpose (2), this particular draft legislation addre1'sed the 
desired tTade practices law and process under Part IV. Restrictive trade practices e dealt 
with under Division 2 of Part rv and other unfair trade practices under Oivi~inn , of the 
same pan. Resale price maintenance was considered under Part VTil of the dmll 
legislation. 
The general scope and purpose ol'pmvision dealing with restrictive trade practice~ should 
be to ''proscribe and regulate agreements and conduct. aimed at procurihg and 
maintaining competition in trade und commerce. Broadly speaking, those provisions 
should either control or proscribe the making of certain contmets or arrangements of the 
reaching of certain understandings, the giving or extracting or certain eovciants in 
relation to land, the engaging conduct involving a secondary boycott. engagin in the 
practices of monopolisation, exclusive dealing or resale price maintenance, eng ging in 
predatory price discrimination. and the increasing of market ~hare by means of lllkeo\'er 
or merger." 
The various trade practices which the draft legislation attempts to restrict (or their 
negative effect on competition arc: I 
(a) exclusionary contractual provision which are likely to have an anti 
competitive effect: 
(b) se::ondar) boycotts aimed at hindering the supply of goods and 
services: 
(c) m:suse of market power; 
(d) exclusive dealing; 
(e) resale price maintenWlce; 
(I) pice discrimination: and 
{g) mergers and acquisition which would les'lCn comp<"tili<m 
Exclusionary Contracts Affecting Competition 
Clause 90 (I) declared that a contractual provision that is aimed at excluding or le;;scnin~ 
competition is prima facie unenforceable. Clause 90 (2) in particular providcd:"A person 
shall not: 
(a) make a contract where; 
( i! the proposed contract contain an exclusionary provision; or 
(ii) a pro\ ision of the proposed contract. has the purposes or effect of substantiall) 
lesS<:ning competition. A contract entered into prior to the promulgation of the legislation 
that has exclusionary provisions or provisions which would have the tffect of 
substantially lessening, are precluded from being given effect to under Clause r0l2) (h) 
of the Act." 
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Clause 92 of the draft legislation is in very similar terms too but is particularly aimed at 
the supply of goods and service. 
Clause 92 (I) in particular reads: 
"A co' enant, whether the covenant was given before or after the commencement of this 
Act. is unenforceable in so far as it confers rights or benefits or imposes duties or 
obligations on u person or, where the person is a corporation. on a person :u;soci:ued with 
the corporation if the covenant has, or is likely to have, the effect of substantiall) 
lessening competition in any market in which the person or [corporation or associated 
corporation] supplies or acquires, or is likely to supply or acquire, goods or sen ices l ht.t 
for the covenant].~ 
Clause 93 of the draft legislation was aimed at rendering unenforc~:able covenant~ which 
may be aimed at or likely to have the effect of "fixing, controlling or maintairing. or 
providing for the fixing. controlling or maintaining of, the price for, or a ~iscoum. 
allowance. rebate or credit in relation to, goods or services supplied or acquire<) by th~ 
persons" in a given market. 
1\ll practices, including contracts, arrangements or understandings which may have th~ 
effect of substantially lessening competition are now addressed under Sections 5~ ru1d 52 
or the new Independent Consumer and Competition Bill 2002. These clauses tak a much 
more simplified approach in drafting in comparison to the approach taken in 1e 1990 
dra(\ legislation. Then by the operation of Section 47 of the 2002 Bill, it is intc dcd that 
these provisions will have extra-territorial application and effect, particularly so to those 
who e:>nduct and have business dealing \~ith companies and such other entities i11 Papua 
New Guinea. I 
Secondary Boycotts aimed at Hindering the Supply of Goods and Services 
i\ boycott is a siruation where people combine and collectively refuse to deal witi1 
another person or corporation in an attempt to bring about a desired result (Hcalc~. 
1993) Boycotts can either be prinlary or secondary. depending on who the parties arc: 
• if employees boycott the goods and services of their employer. then that b a primary 
bo)cott situation; 
• but if employees boycott the business of their employer with a 'iew to bring about their 
desired result on another person, then that becomes a sccondaT) bo)COlt situation, 
The 1996 draft legislation only covered a secondary boycott situation. 
C'lause 94 then rendered secondary boycotts unlawful accordingly stipulating at Cl:uL~e 
94 (1): 
" ••• 11 person shall not. in concert with a second person, engage in conduct that hinders or 
prevents the supply of goods and services by a third person to a fourth pcrsop. t)r the 
acquisition of goods or services hy a third person from a fourth person, if: 
(a) the third person is, and the fourth person is not a corporation and; 
(i) the conduct ''ould have or be likely to have the effect of causing a substantial 
les.<:ening of competition in any market in which the third person supplies or acquires 
goods or services; and 
(ii) the conduct is engaged in for the purpose, and would have or be likely to have the 
effect, of causing a substantiallesserung or competition in any market goods or s~rvic.:s: 
or 
(b) the fourth person is a corporation and the conduct is enRal!.ed in for the purple. and 
would have or be likely to have the effect, of causing substantial lessening of com 'lit ion 
in any :narket in which the fourth person supplies or acquires goods or services. 
The existing case law in other jurisdictions 2 indicate that secondary boycott cond cted in 
the cocrse of an industrial dispute may be caught by the operation of Clause 94. 
Whilst the 1996 draft legislation addressed the anti competitive conduct of secondary 
boycotting in the terms set out abo,·e, the 2002 Bill does not. It therefore is a matter of 
e<>neem to nO\\ realize tlmt despite the well knO\\ll antioompetitive effect of secondar) 
boycott, it is no" not addressed by the 2002 Bill. However under other Papua Ne\\ 
Guinea law, secondary boycott may attract criminal liability (under Section 508 of the 
Criminal Code Act Chapter 262) as well as civil liability if it is not conducted tvithin a 
lawfi.tl.y constituted industrial dispute within the terms of the Industrial Orgaqizatiom. 
Act Chapter 173. I 
M isuse of Market Power 
Clause 95 of the 1996 draft legislation declared illegal any misuse of market power by 
those who have a ·•substantial degree of power" in a market. Clause 95 ( 1) in particular 
read: 
··A person that has a substantial degree of power in a market shall not take advantage of 
that power for the purpose of: 
(a) eliminating or substantially darnagjng competition of a pen;on, or if 
the pe~son is a corporation, of a related corporation in that or any other market:. M 
(b) preventing the entr) of a person into that or any other market; or 1 (c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in th~t or any 
other market." 
The over riding aim of this Clause was no doubt to protect and advance oompet\tion in a 
competitive environment. It is specifically aimed at prohibiting person or cor~ration~ 
who have a substantial degree of market power in a gtvcn market for goods or services 
from taking advantage of that market power with the view to: 
(a) eliminating or substantial!) damaging its oompetitor or the oompetitor of a related 
oorporation; 
(b) pre>ent the cnrry of another person into any market: or 
(c) deterring or preventing competitive conduct in any other market. 
Under the 2002 Bill, thi~ particular anti competitive oonduct is now addressjld under 
Section 58 but is pitched more at taking advantage of market power rather than to abuse 
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or mis·.lSe market power. Under the defmition clause of Section 45 (2) of tt Bill. 
"market" is used in this context to refer to a market in the whole country (Pap~,~a New 
Guinea) for goods or services, including substitutable imports. 
Exclush·e Dealings 
F"du<ive dealings was addressed under Clause 96 of the 1996 drafi legislation. Under 
this clause, a person or corporation will be said to be engaged in exclusive dealing if that 
person: I 
(a) supplies, or offers to supply goods or services; or 
(b) offers to supply such goods and services at a particular price; or 
(c) give~ or allows, or ofl'ers to give or allow. a discount, allowance, rebate or Tredit in 
relation to the supply or propost:d supply of goods or services; on the condition that the 
purch~~Ser of the goods or services is restricted or prohibited from 
(i) purchasing goods or services from a competitor of the person supplying; 
or 
(ii) that the purchaser is restricted or prohibited from re-supplying goods and services or a 
particular kind or description acquired ti·om a competitor of the supplier; or 
(iii) n the case where the person supplies or would supply goods, but on1)1 on the 
condition that the purchaser will not except to a limited extent, re-suppl) the goods: 
• to pc.rticular customers or classes of customers or to customers other than the particular 
customers or classes of customers; or 
• in particular places or classes of places or in places other than particular places or 
classe> of places. 
Exelu>ive dealing wa~ then rendered illegal under Clause 96 (I) of the Jraft bill 
particularly if the effect of these prdcticcs would be aimed at or in effect, I actually 
lessening competition (Clause % (I 0)). 
Clause 96 ( 12) was bound to raise concern in the particular economic circumstante' of 
Papua New Guinea today. This clause was aimed at exempting exclusive dealing 
practices by related body corporate. In the prevailing economic climate in Papua cw 
Guinea, particularly in wholesale and retail and the finance markets \\here these sectors 
are dominated by few corporations who are in actual fact subsidiaries of the fe\~ r· arkct 
players. 
I 
~~~~~~--1--2. See for example the Australian Trade Practices Act Section 450 prohibiting both primary and secunda!) 
bo)COit: Utah Devtlopment Co. and Others V. Seamen's Union of AU>tralia Lid (1977) ATPR 49. T illmans 
Bmch•ries Pty Ltd V. AMIEU (1979) ATPR 138 where Bowen CJ of the Full Federal coun '-~lid: •· ... the 
fact that a Union and its members acting together have a union purpose does not necessarily cxc~ode the 
possibility that they had, also, the purpose of causing substantial loss or damage to the b1 inc" of a 
Corpr·ration ... Evidence in the case before us lead.~. in my view. to the conclu,ion that the e~pondents 
kne" that tbe only p<essure that would be ciTecthe against Tillmans was the prosJ><.'Ct ofactualily ofh>S> or 
dama~e. To cause it was one of their purpose. 
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Giving exemptions for exclusive dealings may have significant anticompetitiv~ effect. 
I' or example, in the wholesale retail market, the TST Group of Companies, Steamship 
Joint Venture (~hich incorporates Steamship Group of Companies. and Collins and 
Leahy Group of Companies who have in tum bought out the Burns Philip Group of 
Companies in Papua New Guinea) and Papindo are without doubt the dominant! market 
players. The existence of Clause 96 (12) may allow the related companies of lhefe three 
to cngngc in exclusive dc3lings which may substanti3lly lt"oS<>n competition to the 
disadvantage and economic hurt of the other smaller competitors. 
It is noted that Clause 96 of the Bill was a cut and paste job of Section 47 of th~ 
Commonwealth of AtL~tralia Trade Practices Act 1974 (as urnended). Clause 961 (12) in 
particular was a reproduction of Section 47 (12) of the Trade Pntctic.cs Act 19~4. 111~ 
economic climate, in panicular the ,,;holesale/retai1 markets in Australia have many 
corporate participants and therefore when related corporations engage in restrictive: 
dealings within the terms allowed under Section 47(12) (or our draft Clause 96(12)) the 
effect on the consumer may be less severe or if not negligible. Compare thi~ to the 
situation in Papua New Guinea where there are only three key players in t c ret11il 
/wholesale market now, it is not at all difficult to foreshadow major difficul · ~s and 
~rious problems for the e'entual consumer. If these three kc) players in the market 
engage in restrictive dealings, the impact would be immediate and significant. 
Strangely enough, exclusive dealings as described above, are not specifically covlred and 
addressed under the 2002 Bill. The nearest that the 2002 Bill goes is Section 52 that 
regulates exclusionary provisions in contracts, arrangements or undertakings which may 
ha~e the effect of substantially lessening competition. If left unregulated, exclusive or 
selective dealings, which are not dependent on exclusionary provisions, but af acntal 
selective dealings, may have drastic effect in damaging and putting out of bfinesscs 
small competitors as exclusive dealings are predatory in nature. 
Resale Price :Maintenance 
Clause 97 of the 1996 Bill rendered illegal the practice of resale price maJtenance 
regardless of its impact on competition. This clause is modelled upon Section l8 of the 
Australian Trade Practices Act. Speaking of this Australian legislation, Healey explains 
that: '·Resale price maintenance is the practice of fixing the minimum sale price of J 
commodity at a subsequent stage in the distribution chain. When a supplier pf goods 
stipulates that they are to be resold at (or not below) a price set by him, he is aqtempting 
to maintain the resale price of the goods." I 
The manifestation of resale price maintenance may come in 'arious forms including 
olTering inducements, threats and mutual agreements aimed at maintaining price at a 
level initiated by the supplier. 
lJndcubtedly there are some correlation between the operation of Clau.~c 97 uJd Clause 
91 which one must be aware of. Clause 91 is pitched at prohibiting contractua I 
arrangements relating to price fixing. e-ontrolling, price maintenance, discount, allowance. 
ll 
rebate or credit by competitors which would have the effect of substantially lfss.::ning 
competition. Clause 97 is aimed at vertical price fixing i.e., price fixing between ~artie~ 
who are not competing against each other. Clause 91 is aimed at horizontal price fixing-
dealing with setting of prices by competitors which therefore Y~ould have the impact of 
lessening competition. 
ln thi~ form. Clause 91 may exempt any price discount. allo"ance or rebattl fixing. 
controlling or maintenance arrangements between joint Yenture partners or Y.hcre the 
panics to such an arrangement include; 
"(a) not less than 50 persons (bodies corporate that are related to one 
another being counted as a single person) who supply in trade or 
commerce, goods or sel'\<ices to which the provision applies; or 
(h) not less than 50 persons (bodies corporate that are related to one 
6nOther being counted as a single person) who acquire. in trade or 
commerce, goods or services to which the provision applies." 
Resale price maintenwtce is now dealt with under Sections 59 and 60 of the lndjpcndcnt 
Consumer and Competition Commission Bill 2002 in very similar terms to wha was set 
out under the 1996 draft legislation as presented above. 
Price Discrimination 
Price discrimination refers to a difference in price "where a different price is c~argcd to 
diflcrcnt customers for similar goods, irrespective of any cost difference in 1rred in 
supplying those customers. Tt may also refer to a difference in prices charged wl ich goes 
bey(lnd reflecting the diiTerence in cost of supplying the difl'erent customers.'' 
Claus~ 98 of the 1996 draft legislation dealt with price discrimination. 
Clause 98 ( 1) in particular was drafted in this form: 
"I. A person shall not, in trade or commerce. discriminate between 
purchasers of Roods of like grade and quality in relation to: 
(a) the prices charged for the goods; or 
(h) any discounts. allowances, rebates or credit given or allowed in 
relation to the supply of the goods; or 
(c) the prO\·ision of services in re.spect of the goods: or 
(d) the making of payments for services pro,·ided in respect of the goods. if the 
discrimination of such magnitude as is of such a recurring or systematic chamcter that it 
has or is likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition in a mur\..et for 
good>, being a market in which the person supplies goods; ·'if the di,crimination of such 
magnitude or is of such a recurring or systematic character that it has or is likely to ha\O: 
the effect of substantially lessening competition in a market for goods, being a market in 
which the perwn supplies goods". 
lhert were however defences or exemptions set out under sub clause 2. 
Such are situations where: 
12 
'"(a) the discrimination makes only reasonable allowance for differences in the cost of 
manufacture, distribution. sale or delivery resulting from the differing places to whicr. 
methods by "hich or quantities in which. the goods are supplied to the purchasers; or 
(b) the discrimination is constituted by the doing of any act in good faith to meet a price 
or bcnctit offered by a competitor of the supplier." 
Price discrimination as presented above is not iocluctcct in the 2002 Bill. In otheJ words. 
the Dill does not have a clause on price discrimination. This is a cau.c;c for concern. In a 
country like Papua :-lew Guinea ''here there are a few independent competitors, in 
virtually all markets, either in tem1s of goods and services or in geographical te~s. but 
consisting of few related participants, there is bound to be a anti competitive beh<~j1viour in 
price discrimination. I 
Mergers and AcquisitionJ> which would Jessen Competition 
The underlying reasons for regulating mergers and acquisition~ have been well Jrated hy 
the Australian Trade Practice~ Act Review Committee (T radc Practices I Review 
Committee Report, 1976) may be considered relevant and from the basis and rationale of 
Papua New Guinea's Clause 99 of the draft legislation. 
'J hat Committee stated that: 
'"ln our view there are two main reasons for including merger provision~ in any 
competition policy law: 
(a) merger provisions are necessar} to prevent the possibility of achieving, by merger. 
anti-competitive results prohibited elsewhere in the same law. 
(b) merger provisions ensure that the control of significant capital u.s~e1 in the 
community does not change hands in circumstances that disregard any anti co tpetitivc 
eflects of the change." 
Clause 99 of the 1996 draft legislation dealt with the regulation of mergers and 
acquisitions so that dominnnre in a market is not achieved where such domifance of 
market power may have the ultimate effect of lessening competition. This cl use was 
drafted and presented in this tenns: 
··A person shall not directly or indirectly: 
(a) acquire shares in the capital of a bod) corporate; or 
(b) acquire any assets of a per~on. if the acquisition would have the effect, 
or likely to have the effect, of subst<mtially lessening competition in 
a market." 
Given the current state of the cconorn) where there arc few participants or players in the 
respective markets of the economy, a law prohibiting mergers and acquisitions which 
would have the effect of lessening competition is absolutely necessary in my view. In fact 
the current market dominance that Steamships Trading has through their various 
subsidiaries is a direct result of the gap that exists in our laws in this area of cor1pctition 
law and the regulation of anti-competitive bcha,iour. In the early 1990s. Steamship~ 
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Trading Company acquired the wholesale retail operations of Bums Philp Trading and 
the entire automobile business of New Guinea Motors. 
Subsequently. Steamships were in tum acquired by the Bromley and Manton and Collin~ 
and Leahy group of Companies. As are result, the entire wholesale/retail marki in the 
llighlands of Papua New Guinea is dominated and controlled by this Steamships Collins 
and Leahy Group of Companies. 
The Independent Consumer and Competition Commission Bill 2002 has dropped merger~ 
from. it~ regulatory pu~v~e.w but i~tends to regulate aC<!Uisitions under .sectio1 69. by 
prohibiting those aC<!UlSltlons whJch may have the effect of substanllally lqsserung 
competition. There has been no explanation given in the explanatory notes to the! Bill as 
to ~\hy mergers have been dropped from the current Section 69 of the Bill. Yet mergers 
between related competitors poses a strong anti-competitive threat for Papua New Guinea 
given the situation that most of .the companies and ~uch other business ent]'ties are 
actually related through share holdmgs or parent compames. 
Initiatives under the 2002 Bill 
After the General Elections in 1997, there was a change of government and con~oquentl> . 
change in personnel as well, where the then Executive Director of the ConsumlAffairs 
Council no longer held office. Much of the impetus for the proposed lcgislativ reform 
for the introduction of competition law and policy as discussed above in the 1 6 dral\ 
legislation were now placed again on the back burner. Fortunately before the momentum 
in the first wa\e died do~n, there was a change in Government in mid 2000 and this sa" 
the introduction of a much more aggressive privati/.ation programme under the new 
~1ckere Morautn Government. llenceforth the privatization prograrrune propelled! the nc\' 
luok competition law and policy that has now been unveiled in the lndtpendent 
Consumer and Competition Bill 2002. In many ways, this Bill departs from the 1996 
drafi legislation, the peninent clauses of which were presented above. 
The 2002 Bill can be described as an all encompassing Bill which addresses ~1uler one 
legislation competition law and policy matters and establishes the Independent onsumcr 
and Competition Commission (the TCCC) as a regulator of competition, chien} through 
the process of regulatory contracts. and then deals with consumer protection and pric<' 
regulation issues. To achieve these, the Bill proposes to repeal the Consumer Affair' 
Council Act 1993 and collapse those powers and functions into the new rcgula~ry bod} 
it creates, the Independent Consumer and Competition Commission. ln introd cing thi s 
Bill to the Parliament, the Prime Minister is recorded in the Parliamentary Han ard. lirst 
as having declared that the Bill actually establishes a ne" industry regulator. the !CCC 
Secondly, he is reported as having stated that the Commission is primed to play a pivotal 
role ':>y promoting better business conduct, and where appropriate, closely T,gulating 
these conducts with the aim of attaining structural efficiency in the nations econlmy. 
In summary, the 2002 Bill: (a) I!Stablishes the Commission (!CCC); (b) introduces a n<!w 
regime for the regulation of certain industries. entities and goods and services. includin~ 
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the regulation of price and related service standards under regulatory contracts: (c) allows 
the Commission to make codes or rules relating to regulated industries or entities; (d) 
provides for appeals from certain dedsions of the Commission to an independent appeals 
panel: (c) states competition law policies and principles by introducing laws which 
prohib:t certain anti-competitive market practices, which laws the Commission will be 
administering; (f)abolbhes the Consumer Affairs Council and confers on the Co~ission 
all matters relating to consumer protection inclucling price control ti.mctions an added 
powers allowing for the compulsory recall of unsafe products. 
Some of the main features of the new 2002 Bill relating to the topic under consid ation 
are discussed below: 
Regulllled Entities, Goods, Services a11d Contracts 
Scctio:t 32 of the Uill allows the national go\emment Minister responsible for treasury to 
declare an entity to be a "regulated entity .. if that entity was in the first instance a sate-
o,~ned enterprise or within 3 months after that state 0\\11Cd enterprise has been privatized. 
In addition, Section 32 allows the Minister responsible for treasury matters to declare 
goods or services supplied or capable of being supplied by such a regulated entjt) to be 
"regulated goods or services". Quite apart from the powers given to the ~inister 
responsible for treasury matters by Section 32, the Commission is also give similar 
powers under Section 33 to declare an entity to be a regulated entity (irresp ctivc of 
wheth¢r or not the entity is a former state-owned enterprise) and the goods or services 
suppli!d or capable of being supplied by that regulated entity to be regulated ~oods or 
services. 'lbe Commission can however make such a declaration only if it is sati~'icd that 
the entity concerned has a substantial degree of power in the market and the declaration is 
appropriate having regard to the Commission's objectives in regulating competition b) 
guarding against anti-<:ompctitive conduct. The consequence of declaring an entity to be 1 
regulated entity is that a regulatory contract regulating that entit) may be made b) the 
Minis:er responsible for treasury matters or the Commis~ion, as the case may be. 
Section 34 of the 2002 Rill then provides that where the Minister responsible for treasury 
matters has declared an entity to be regulated entity, the Minister may the~1·ssue a 
regulatory contract applying to that regulated entity. Likewise, where the Co ission 
has exercised its powers under Section 33 of the Rill and declared an entity to be a 
regulatory entity, it can then proceed to issue a regulatory contract. Sections 3 and 35 
arc the provisions which set out the features of a regulatory contract where tl Jim11cr 
provision deals with regulated contracts to be issued by the Minister and tJ'te latter 
concerns itself with regulatory contracts to be issued by the Commission. The essential 
features of these regulatory contracts are a~ follows. Th~se contracts: 
must be for terms under l 0 years; 
must regulate the price at which regulated goods and regulated 
services may be supplied by the regulated entil) over the term nf the 
regulatory contract; 
• must specify service standards the relevant regulated entity must 
meet, together ,.,;th payments which the relevant rcgulmed entity 
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must make to customers and oth~:r persons (whether by way of rebate 
or otherwise), or price reductions which may be imposed, if the 
relevant regulated entity fails to meet those service standards; 
must specify a process for the issue of a new regulatory contract to 
replace that regulatory contract on the expiry of its term; 
must specify pricing policies and principles that are to be adopted in 
any regul~tory ('.Ontr~ct that is issued in replacement of that re~ulatory 
contract on the expiry of its term; and 
must deal with such other matters as other Acts require to be dealt with in a 
regulatOry contract (Subsections 34(2) and 35(3)). 
A regulated entity must comply with the terms of any regulated contract ac; required by 
Sectio, 37 of the Bill. Section 38 of the Bill then mandates the Commission to enforce 
these contracts by issuing appropriate compliance orders. Then undt:r Section 3f9 of the 
Bill, failure to comply with such orders may result in the imposition of a line f 11p to 
KlO,OOO, 000 (about $5,000,000 Australian). In addition, the Commission may recover 
from the regulated entity an amount equal to any profit made as a result of f~iling ~~~ 
comply with the imposed orders. 
Conclusion 
The recent initiatives, as represented by the two waves of attempts, to Jdopt an 
appropriate competition law and policy in Papua New Guinea are. n~ doubt 
commendable. Prior to this, particularly in the mid to late 1970s the emphasi$ on law 
refonn and policy formulation was more directed at consumer protection rather than the 
forces of competition and its ultimate negative impacts on the consumer. Given th: 
Government's recent aggressive privatization program, it is imperative that appTl*riatc 
competition law regime be instituted so that the advantages of privatization are not lost. 
Misuse of market power, particularly by the soon to be privatized state-owned c tcrprise>. 
which are in fact public monopolies, presents a real danger to the nation's econom). 
Hcnc~ the need fi)r a strong competition regulator. The introduction of the Independent 
Consumer and Competition Commission Bill 2002 March early this year is thcrctore 
commendable. With the introduction of the concept of regulatory contracts, which in 
essence are conlra~ts which the regulated cntit~. will enter into wit~ the Icq: as the: 
regulator, concemmg all matters of compctlhveness, good tradmg prac~ce, and 
reasonable pricing, as stipulated under Section 35 of the Bill, one can be contipcnt that 
unfair trade practices and other anti-competitive behaviour will be properly sdrutinized 
and brought under control. 
'lbe other matters of concern, as expressed in the body of the paper, relates to ~e lack of 
adequate coverage of the new 2002 !)ill of certain anti-competitive b haviour. 
particularly those dealing with secondary boycotts, exclusive dealin s, price 
discrimination and the effect of mergers on competitiveness. 
In this regard, it is perhaps fair to comment that the first wave in the attempts to introduc~ 
a strong competition law regime, as reflected in the 1996 draft legislation, represented .1 
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much more comprehensive effort than the second wave in the 2002 Bill. There is 
however still room for amendments later on. We can now only look fomard to the actual 
implenentation of the 2002 Bill. On current indications, the new Independent Consumer 
and Competition Commission should be up and running by the end of this year 2002. 
ASIAMONF:Y, (1993) Papua New Guinea: The New Pacific, Supplement Ma' (Hong 
Kong). 
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